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I. Okinawa – The Prefecture That Keeps Saying No  
Modern Japanese history has no precedent for the phenomenon of a 
prefecture saying “No” to the authorities of two of the world’s great powers, and 
doing so consistently, over a period of decades. The political history of Okinawa 
in the 48 years since its reversion has been one of resistance to the assigned 
status of Client State of the United States’ Client State of Japan. Prime Minister 
Abe appears to see Okinawa as a patch of enemy territory within an otherwise 
submissive domain, yet it is the Okinawans who take seriously his call for going 
“beyond the post-war system” and “taking back” Japan. For them, however, it is 
Okinawa itself, “lost” 74 years ago, that is to be taken back and Abe who stands 
in the way, blocking them.  
Okinawa’s confrontation with the Japanese nation state is rooted in the unique 
experience of incorporation by violence – into the early modern (Edo) state in 1609 
and into the modern (Meiji) state in 1879,(1) followed by the overwhelming 
catastrophe of war in 1945, the ensuing severance from Japan, US occupation 
  
(1) See G. McCormack (2018). “Ryukyu/Okinawa’s trajectory: from periphery to centre, 1600-  
2015”. In Sven Saaler and Christopher W.A. Szpilman (Eds.), Routledge Handbook of Modern 
Japanese History (pp. 118-134). London and New York: Routledge. 
* Gavan McCormack is emeritus professor of the Australian National University in Canberra, a fellow of the 
Australian Academy of the Humanities and a founding editor of the Asia-Pacific Journal - Japan Focus. His 
recent publications include: Resistant Islands: Okinawa Confronts Japan and the United States, 
Lanham,Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2012, (co-authored with Satoko Oka Norimatsu, Japanese, Korean, 
and Chinese translations of first edition from Horitsu Bunkasha, Changbi, and SSAP in 2013-2015. second, 
revised and expanded, paperback English edition, 2018); The State of the Japanese State: Contested Identity, 
Direction and Role, Folkestone, Kent, Renaissance Books, 2018; and “Ryukyu/Okinawa’s trajectory: from 
periphery to centre, 1600-2015,” in Sven Saaler and Christopher W.A. Szpilman, eds., Routledge Handbook of 
Modern Japanese History, London and New York: Routledge, 2018, pp. 118-134.  
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between 1945 and 1972 as Japan’s “war state,” matching the mainland-Japan 
“peace state” under the San Francisco Treaty determination of 1951,(2) and the 
fierce, ongoing confrontation with the national government over the key 
national policy for Okinawa from 1972: that its raison d’être has to be: serve the 
United States.(3) 
 
During the early years of US occupation, while under complete US military 
control, the islands were assigned a key role in global war planning. Up to 1,300 
nuclear weapons were stored there and Pentagon planners assumed a major role 
for Okinawa in scenarios involving the destruction of all major cities in the then 
Soviet Union and China, with the killing of around 600 million people (sic) very 
possibly bringing human civilization itself to an end.(4) And, in case that might 
not suffice, the US also stockpiled 13,000 tons of poison gas materials, of which 
Okinawans only learned when some leaked out.(5) Struggling then against the 
appropriation of their land, they believed that if only Okinawa were to be 
restored to Japan the principles of the constitution would ensure recognition of 
their democratic rights and the winding back of bases and return of their land. It 
was a vain hope. Instead, under the process known in Okinawa as the terror of 
“bayonet and bulldozer” expropriation of their land proceeded inexorably, and 
military bases consolidated. After the reversion (in 1972), US hegemony, and 
the associated priority to its military, simply became entrenched. US 
extraterritorial control spread over a network of bases covering just under 20 per 
cent of the land 
 
 
(2) See G. McCormack (2014). “The San Francisco Treaty at Sixty—The Okinawa Angle”. In Kimie 
Hara (Ed.), The San Francisco System and Its Legacies: Continuation, Transformation, and 
Historical Reconciliation in the Asia-Pacific (pp. 144-161), New York and London, Routledge. 
(3) For details, Gavan McCormack and Satoko Oka Norimatsu (2018). Resistant Islands: Okinawa 
Confronts Japan and the United States, Second Edition. Rowman and Littlefield. 
(4) Daniel Ellsberg (2017). The Doomsday Machine: Confessions of a nuclear war planner. London, 
Bloomsbury Publications, See also Ellsberg in conversation with Peter Hannam (2018). Setting the 
world alight. Sydney Morning Herald, 9 March 2018. 
(5) Okinawa Prefectural Archives (2019). Doku gasu heiki tekkyo no tatakai. Retrieved January 16, 
2020, from https://www.archives.pref.okinawa.jp/event_information/exhibition_ course/8248/ 
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area of Okinawa Island and including two airports, three marine ports, mutiple 
training areas, hospitals and communications facilities, three golf courses and 
about one dozen schools. 
 
With the end of the Cold War, Okinawans again began to hope for a “peace 
dividend” via the return of their land. Not only was this not to be, but the 
infamous rape of a twelve-year old Okinawan girl by three US servicemen in 
1995 stirred unprecedented anger and sadness. The two governments sought to 
quell these sentiments by promising that Futenma Marine Air Station would be 
returned within “five to seven years.” Like the “reversion” of Okinawa itself in 
1972, it was an empty promise, Futenma would only be returned once a 
substitute facility had been constructed, and that substitute would have to be in 
Okinawa. The proposal was rejected, firstly by a Nago City plebiscite in 1997, 
by numerous resolutions of the Okinawan parliament and successive Okinawan 
governors, but the two governments have not since wavered.(6) The project, 
initially for a “heliport,” gradually grew into a grand, multi-functional facility 
with twin, “V”-shaped, 1,800-meter runways on a platform projecting ten 
meters above the sea, plus ancillary deep-sea port and storage facilities. 
 
II. Manoeuvres, Judicial and Political, 2006-2019  
Following the agreement of the two governments on the grand design for 
“Realignment of US Forces in Japan” (2006), and preliminary survey works at 
the designated site, Henoko on Oura Bay, the issue moved to the top of the 
agenda of Okinawan politics. 
 
A governor committed to stopping the proposal, Nakaima Hirokazu, was 
elected in 2010. Under heavy pressure – or, just possibly in accord with a carefully 
orchestrated plan – he reversed himself three years later, agreeing to the reclamation 
of Oura Bay and the construction of the new base. He was denounced by the 
Prefectural Assembly, then voted out of office the following year (2014), 
  
(6) For details, see Gavan McCormarck (2018). The State of the Japanese State: contested identity,  
direction, and role. Kent: Renaissance Books. See also G. McCormack, and Norimatsu (2018). 
Resistant Islands, passim. 
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replaced by Onaga Takeshi, elected on a mandate to continue the opposition to the 
base. Onaga did indeed stop the works in October 2015, cancelling (torikeshi) the 
license, but the government immediately countermanded his order and the Supreme 
Court ruled against him in September 2016.(7) Preliminary construction work resumed 
in April 2017. In July 2018, confronting serious, soon to prove fatal, illness, 
Governor Onaga launched formal proceedings to rescind (tekkai) the original, 
problematic reclamation license issued by his predecessor. No sooner did he do this, 
however, than he suddenly died (on 8 August). 
 
The prefecture continued the process of revocation, and works were 
suspended (from 31 August). Again, however, the state moved to strike down 
the prefecture’s protest. The (government’s) Okinawan Defence Bureau called 
on Ishii Kei-ichi, Minister of Land, Infrastructure, and Transportation, to review 
the prefectural revocation under the Administrative Appeal Act and issue an 
order cancelling its effect. On 30 October, Minister Ishii did what was required 
of him, suspending the prefectural order and ruling that any rescission of the 
reclamation permit was “unreasonable” and “likely to undermine relations of 
trust with Japan’s security ally, the United States.”(8) 
 
In September 2018, despite an unprecedented level of national government 
intervention on behalf of its preferred candidate, the anti-base construction Tamaki 
Denny was elected governor succeeding to the deceased Onaga Takeshi by a 
massive (eighty-thousand-vote) margin. His campaign pledge was clear: he would 
stop the Henoko reclamation/construction works. Within days of his election, 
however, the Abe government declared that it intended to proceed regardless of 
prefectural sentiment. Brushing aside outraged Okinawan protests in November the 
Okinawa Defense Bureau (ODB) ordered works at Oura resumed. Since then fleets 
of tankers and ships have been mobilized but to date works have been confined to 
the shallow waters of Henoko that constitute around one-quarter of the site, leaving 
untouched the deep waters of Oura Bay. Works continued through 2019. 
  
(7) On the complex legal moves of 2016-2019, McCormack and Norimatsu, pp. 280-291.  
(8) Kyodo.Okinawa governor meets top gov't official over US base transfer. The Mainichi, 
November 6, 2018. 
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As successive recent Okinawan prefectural and national elections returned anti-
base construction candidates, Governor Tamaki repeatedly called on Prime Minister 
Abe to enter a dialogue on the differences between nation and prefecture, but Abe 
refused. The national daily Asahi editorialized early in 2019 that the Henoko project 
was “clearly doomed” and that it was time to “to open talks with the US.”(9) 
Although the project at the end of 2019 was only around one-per cent complete, 
already 147 billion yen, more than one-third of the originally allocated budget, had 
been spent.(10) If expenditure was to continue at that rate (147 billion yen for one per 
cent of the project), it would eventually cost the Japanese state fourteen trillion yen 
or 127 billion dollars. The civic opposition protest movement continues on a day-to-
day basis while the Government spend a staggering 20 million yen (around 
$180,000) per day, just for security guards tasked with crushing or inhibiting local 
opposition.(11) In 2016-2017 the UN Human Rights Commission lambasted the 
government of Japan for its five month-long detention of protest leader Yamashiro 
Hiroji in solitary confinement as if he were a terrorist.(12) For having baffled and 
infuriated the state by his brilliance as choreographer of the resistance, leading it in 
song, dance and debate, he was seen as a dangerous foe. His confinement, the 
UNHCR said, “constitutes a violation of Articles 2 and 7 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and Articles 2(1), 26 and 27 of the Covenant, on the 
grounds of discrimination against a civic 
  
(9) Asahi Shimbun. Henoko project clearly doomed; time to open talks with the US. 
Asahi shimbun, February 23, 2019. 
(10) “Henoko 9300 oku en umetate o sokuji chushi seyo.” editorial, Ryukyu Shimpo. December 27, 
2019. 
 
(11) The per person daily rate is a remarkable 90,000 yen or around $825. (Mochizuki Isoko at al 
(2019). Zei o ou – hadome naki boeihi (10) Henoko-shin kichi kensetsu kenmin osae saigen 
naki yosan. Tokyo Shimbun, 25 November 2019).  
(12) Gavan McCormack, and Norimatsu, Resistant Islands, 2018, pp. 295-6. And see, UN Working 
Group on Arbitrary Detention, Human Rights Council. Opinion No 55/2018 concerning 
Yamashiro Hiroji (Japan), Opinions adopted by the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention at 
its eighty-second session, 20-24 August 2018. UN Human Rights Council, December 27, 2018 
A/HRC/WGAD/2018/55 
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activist aimed at and resulting in ignoring the equality of human beings.”  
Expert opinion on the Henoko project is negative. To cite just three 
examples: in October 2018 a statement bearing the signatures of 110 
administrative law specialists declared the government to be acting “illegally … 
lacking in impartiality or fairness,” and failing “to qualify as a state ruled by 
law;”(13) in January 2019, 131 constitutional law specialists, academics and 
lawyers, published a similar statement declaring the government’s actions a 
matter of the fundamental human rights of the people of Okinawa, and the 
Henoko project both illegal and unconstitutional,(14) and in a prefectural 
referendum on 24 February 2019 just over 72 per cent of voters said No to the 
project, far outweighing the 19 per cent in favor of it (or the 8.7 per cent who 
voted “neither”).(15) Undeterred, the government pressed ahead. 
 
Although Prime Minister Abe insists that Japan is a country governed by law, as 
one representative of this constitutionalist group put it, “What the Abe 
administration is doing in Okinawa is, precisely, trampling on the ‘rule of law’.” 
Governor Onaga (in office 2014-2018) was acclaimed by Okinawans when he 
berated the national government as “condescending,” “outrageous,” “childish,” 
“depraved,” [rifujin, otonagenai, daraku shita] and “ignoring the people’s will.”(16) 
 
III. Bay-Bottom Mayonnaise 
 
In February 2019, a panel for the resolution of disputes between central and 
local governments rejected an Okinawan prefectural government plea 
 
 
 
 
(13) Okinawa taimusu (2018). Henoko Shin Kichi, Gyoseiho Kenkyusha 110 Nin No Seimeibun 
Zenbun. Okinawa taimusu, October 31, 2018. 
(14) Ryukyu Shimpo (2019). 131 Constitutional Scholars Speak up against Henoko Base 
Construction. Ryukyu Shimpo, January 24, 2019. (Words quoted from Iijima Shigeaki of 
Nagoya Gakuin University).  
(15) E. Johnston (2019). More than 70% in Okinawa vote no to relocation of US Futenma base to 
Henoko. Japan Times, February 24, 2019. 
(16) McCormack and Norimatsu, pp. 278-9 
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to overturn the Ishii order on technical grounds.(17) It was the fifth negative or 
unresponsive judicial process. The prefecture months later launched two further 
suits challenging the validity of National Land Minister Ishii’s cancelation of 
the Okinawa Governor’s August 2018 cancelation of the reclamation license, 
one under the Local Autonomy Law in the Naha branch of the Fukuoka High 
Court on 18 July and the other under the Administrative Case Litigation Law in 
the Naha District Court on 7 August.(18) It protested, both formally that the 
Minister’s decision had been an improper exercise of power by the government 
 
– acting as both “player and umpire”(19) as Denny put it – since one section of it 
was adjudicating on the propriety of the act of another, and substantially, that 
the site was incompatible with the military purposes assigned it because the Bay 
floor was composed of sludge and crossed by active fault lines. Okinawans soon 
came to refer to the Bay bottom as made of mayonnaise, or occasionally of tofu. 
 
Both factors, concealed from the public at the time of the environmental impact 
survey (2014-2016), only came to light in 2018 due to the efforts of civic protest 
groups under Freedom of Information. In December 2018, the government said that 
it would address the problem by inserting forty thousand sand compaction piles into 
the seabed. In January, it raised the number to sixty thousand. A few weeks later it 
became 76,999, while increasing the depth to which they would have to be inserted 
from sixty to ninety metres (sixty in water and 
 
 
 
 
(17) On the grounds that the prefectureʼs suit was based on the Administrative Complaints Review 
Act, but that the tribunal only had jurisdiction over complaints under the Local Autonomy Act 
(The Mainichi (2019). Dispute resolution panel throws out Okinawa request to reinstate 
landfill ban. The Mainichi, February 19, 2019).  
(18) For summary of these two suits, Okinawa Environmental Justice Project (2019). Review 
Henoko Plan!: 33 civic groups send a statement regarding US National Defense Authorization 
Act for FY 2020. (November 1) Retrieved January 20, 2020, from http://okinawaejp.blogspot. 
 
com/2019/11/review-henoko-plan-33-civil-groups-send.html/, http://okinawaejp.blogspot. 
com/2019/11/review-henoko-plan-33-civil-groups-send.html/. 
(19) Quoted in Okinawa taimusu, April 6, 2019.  
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thirty in sludge).(20) On 30 January 2019 Prime Minister Abe made a remarkable 
admission to the Diet: he could neither say when the project would be completed nor 
how much it would cost.(21) Two weeks later, on 15 February, his government 
submitted to the Diet documents reckoning that “bottom enforcement” works would 
take an additional three years and eight months, so that, even according to the “best” 
scenarios for construction, the date for reversion of Futenma would be pushed back 
well beyond the 2022 target agreed in 2013. 
 
Structural engineers doubt that the massive concrete and steel structure planned 
for Henoko-Oura Bay could be stably imposed on the designated site because of 
those two factors. They doubt that Japan has the necessary engineering skills or 
experience for reclamation under such conditions. No country had ever attempted 
anything like it. And, even if the government persists with the project, it would call 
for “more than ninety” sand compaction vessels to be mobilized to Oura Bay, their 
anchor chains inevitably scraping the sea-bed, bringing noise and pollution certain to 
weigh heavily on dugongs, sea turtles, and other Bay dwellers.(22) Improbably, the 
Government claimed that the massive project could be accomplished without 
seriously affecting the Bay as eco-system. At very least, the original design would 
have to be fundamentally re-drawn.(23) 
 
As of the end of 2019, the government insisted that it would proceed with  
 
 
(20) Ryukyu Shimpo (2019). Nanjaku jiban ni kui 6 man bon, koto mukei na koji o yameyo. (February 3, 
2019). Retrieved January 16, 2020, from https://ryukyushimpo.jp/editorial/ entry-870361.html/ For 
the 76,999 and ninety metre figures see Ryukyu Shimpo (2020). Asase mo kui 1.3 man bon, nanjaku 
jiban koji kei 7.6 man bon boei kyoku hokokusho de hanmei. February 3, 2019. For analysis in 
English, Hideki Yoshikawa. (2019). Abe’s military base plan sinking in mayonnaise: implications 
for the US court and IUCN. The Asia-Pacific Journal 
 
– Japan Focus.  
(21) Abe to the Diet on 30 January 2019: “Koki ya hiyo ni tsuite kakutaru koto o moshiageru koto 
wa konnan.” 
(22) Okinawa prefecture - Washington DC office (2019). Concerns for Environmental Impacts of 
Seabed Improvement Work in Land Reclamation in Henoko. (July 17, 2019). Retrieved 
January 16, 2020, from http://dc-office.org/post/1056/ 
(23) Kitaueda Tsuyoshi (2019). Henoko shin kichi wa tonza suru. Sekai (July 2019), pp. 44-54. 
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the construction but it drastically revised its estimates of both cost and time.(24) It 
will dig 77,000 holes deep into the Bay floor, insert a ninety-metre-high pillar of 
sand into each one, and top it with a vast spread of concrete and steel, using 
untried engineering techniques, in an unpredictable time frame. Reclamation 
will follow, and could be expected to take twice as long as originally estimated 
(ten years instead of five), with construction of the actual military facilities – 
base, port, weapons storage bunkers – to follow then and to take at least an 
additional three years. The government’s December 2019 figures were roughly 
in accord with Okinawa Prefecture’s December 2018 estimate so far as time (13 
years) was concerned but where the prefecture estimated cost blowout at two 
and a half trillion yen ($23 billion), ten times the original estimate,(25) the 
government gave a much lower, though still humongous figure of 930 billion 
yen, just 2.7 times greater. 
 
The “helipad” project of 1996 was first bruited as something to be 
accomplished so that Futenma Marine Air Station, situated in the midst of 
Ginowan City could be returned to Japan within five to seven years. It is now 
set to remain in US hands till the late 2030s. The Abe government has 
committed Japan’s highest state priority through the coming two decades to the 
construction of a base to suit the convenience of the US Marine Corps. Despite 
official protestations, it was inconceivable that the project could go ahead 
without seriously affecting the bay as eco-system for the thousands of creatures 
that inhabit it. Astonishingly, the massive scale, serial miscalculations, and 
many times revised completion date stirred scarcely a whimper of protest at the 
national level from ether parliament or media. 
 
Inevitably, estimates as to time and cost both depended on first securing the   
(24) Okinawa media in late December 2019, especially Okinawa taimusu of Deember 23, (“Henoko 
kansei made 13 nen, Futenma henkan mo 2030 nendai nakaba igo ni nanjaku jiban de seifu 
mitoshi,” and editorials in Okinawa taimusu, December 24, 2019 (“Shin kichi kansei made 13 
nenʼ koji chushi betsu no michi sagure”) and Ryukyu Shimpo, December 27, 2019 (“Henoko 
9300 oku en, umitate sokuji chushi seyo”).  
(25) Asahi Shimbun (2018). Okinawa says new base to cost 10 times what Tokyo estimated. Asahi 
shimbun, December 12, 2018. 
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consent of the prefecture to a major re-design. Since Governor Tamaki had been 
elected on a platform of opposition to any construction, and had many times 
reiterated that opposition, further prolonged delay at least could be expected. 
Despite the Abe government’s concession that the project faced huge new 
difficulties, was way over time and cost, and could not be completed till some time 
in the 2030s, the wheels ground inexorably on. Although it would lock Japan into 
military support and dependence on the United States for decades to come it was a 
base, according to Abe, that simply had to be built. And, while attention focussed on 
Henoko, the people of Ginowan City, unwilling hosts to Futenma Marine Corps, 
would have to endure hosting “the world’s most dangerous base” for at least one and 
probably two or more decades. Were it located in the continental US in such a high-
risk setting, the Henoko project would never get off the ground and, irrespective of 
any replacement, Futenma Marine Air Station would be closed forthwith for safety 
and environmental reasons. 
 
Apart from the mayonnaise bay bottom and the fault lines across Oura Bay the 
time for building military bases on sea-front sites may have passed due to the threat 
of rising ocean levels caused by global warming.(26) As the collapse of the polar and 
Himalayan glaciers gathers momentum, ocean front cities such as Naha and Nago 
are bound to suffer. It is a factor not yet seriously considered, but undoubtedly the 
Pentagon has an eye on it. According to one well-informed observer, the major US 
naval shipyard at Norfolk, Virginia, might become unusable thirty years from now, 
and that same fate likely awaits the projected Henoko base “in 60 or 70 years.”(27) 
Kansai International Airport (opened in 1994) was also built on a reclaimed island 
(in Osaka Bay) at a cost of around $20 billion, but, although it too was reinforced by 
the insertion of multiple piles, it continues 
 
(26) The sea-level around Okinawa has risen at the average rate of 2.2 mm per year since 1954, 
slightly less than the global average but at rising rate. Okinawa Kishodai (2019). Okinawa no 
kiko hendo kenshi ripoto. (March, 2019). Retrieved January 28, 2020, from https://www.jma-
net.go.jp/okinawa/data/kiko/2019_all.pdf/ 
(27) Lawrence Wilkerson, former senior adviser to Colin Powell in George W. Bush administration 
in the early 1990s, quoted in “Koron, Henoko, Beikoku kara mita rorensu uirukuson, jamesu 
schoff san,” Asahi shimbun, February 22, 2019. 
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to slowly sink and had to be closed when almost submerged by storms in 2018. 
 
IV. Prospects, 2020 and Beyond 
 
Despite its adoption by the national government as a state policy priority of 
the highest order, all attempts by the two governments over decades to persuade, 
buy off, or intimidate the people of the Okinawa islands into submission to the 
clientelist, military-first prescription have failed. Works continue, and such is 
the imbalance of forces that one would have to think the Okinawan resistance 
doomed in the end to be crushed and Okinawa subjected permanently to military 
priorities. What are the prospects in this mighty struggle between the governor 
and people of Okinawa and the state of Japan? 
 
Firstly, it is almost inconceivable that Okinawa prefecture might win a judicial 
victory, a court at some level finding for them and ordering a stop to the Henoko 
base works. Ever since the Sunagawa case in 1959 the principle adopted then by the 
Supreme Court has held firm: that matters pertaining to the security treaty with the 
US are “highly political” and so not to be subjected to judicial contest.(28) In effect, 
the Security Treaty (Ampo) trumps the constitution (Kempo), there is no division of 
powers, and the judiciary is sure to uphold state prerogative. Even if every single 
Okinawan were to say “No,” the government would still press ahead and the courts 
would legitimise its doing so. The new base would be built. 
 
On 23 October 2019 the court delivered its verdict in the first of the two 2019 
cases, brusquely dismissing the prefecture’s case. On the procedural matter, it found, 
mysteriously, that although there were differences between a claim by an individual 
and a claim by the state, “in matters of substance (honshitsu bubun) there was no 
difference,”(29) in effect declaring that state power was not to be constrained by the 
constitutional principle of local self-government. The Asahi shimbun summed up the 
outcome by saying “It is utterly unacceptable for the courts, which are supposed to 
see that the law is observed, to retrospectively 
  
(28) McCormack and Norimatsu, pp. 53-54.  
(29) Ryukyu Shimpo (2019). Kanyo torikeshi sosho, kuni tsuiju no ippoteki na hanketsu da. 
Ryukyu Shimpo, October 24, 2019. 
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legitimize governmental acts that trample on the spirit of the law.”(30) The court 
had nothing to say on the substantial question of the highly problematic site. 
While judgement in this (July 2019) case is referred on appeal to the 
Supreme Court proceedings still continue in the second (Naha District Court) 
case in which the prefecture has filed a 432-page document with several 
additional attachments.(31) If the courts are true to form, judgement in a few lines 
retrospectively endorsing decisions by the national government can be expected. 
 
V. Political Resolution? 
 
If the judicial prospect looks uncertain, what then of the prospect of a political 
resolution? Might the popular movement evolve to such a point that it can compel 
the government to back down and submit to the will of the Okinawan people? 
Alternatively might the Abe government at last succeed in its task of persuading or 
educating the Okinawan people to accept the Henoko base? One seems as unlikely 
as the other. Prime Minister Abe is most likely impervious to any essentially moral 
case and the Okinawan people have shown in every conceivable forum over decades 
that they are not to be moved. The sit-ins and protest events to date have certainly 
delayed and complicated the works, but they have not stopped or even seriously 
threatened them. Currently the Tamaki administration attempts to sway national 
(and international) opinion by a “caravan” campaign pleading the “All-Okinawa” 
cause nationally and by presentations by the Governor and members of the 
Prefectural Assembly internationally, but again to date without significant (or at 
least conspicuous) impact. The Okinawan movement sticks to classic, non-violent 
appeals to law, reason, and persuasion, believing that truth and justice will 
eventually prevail, but it faces a ruthless and unprincipled opponent, 
 
 
(30) Asahi Shimbun (2019). Henoko hanketsu ‘datsu-ho kyoi’ yurushita shiho. Editorial, Asahi 
shinbun, October 26, 2019. 
(31) Okinawa taimusu (2019). Henoko de 7 do-me no saiban’ kosei de jisshitsuteki na shinri wo. 
 
Okinawataimusu,July18,2019.Fortextofthedossier, 
 
https://www.pref.okinawa.jp/site/chijiko/henoko/documents/190807sojou.pdf/ (Retrieved 
January 16, 2020). 
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and the odds against any “local” movement pitted against the nation state are 
almost infinitely unequal. 
 
In terms of the balance, or imbalance, of forces, the Governor is a 
somewhat ambiguous figure. The common view beyond Okinawa is that both 
the present and immediate past Governors (Tamaki Denny and Onaga Takeshi) 
are/were anti-base and anti-military, but that is not quite true. Both have been 
conservative supporters of the base system and the US-Japan military alliance. 
In fact, with the sole exception of Ota Masahide, governor between 1990 and 
1998, no Okinawan governor has challenged the overarching insistence of the 
US and Japanese governments that military and alliance interests should be 
paramount in determining Okinawan policy. For daring to suggest otherwise, 
and to conceive of a future demilitarised Okinawa, Ota earned the unrelenting 
hostility of Tokyo and was removed from office.(32) Former Governor Onaga, by 
contrast, even seems to have entertained the bizarre aspiration to have Okinawa 
serve as a global command center for the Marine Corps.(33) 
 
Furthermore, while the Governor and majority Okinawan opinion opposes new 
base construction at Henoko, under relentless state pressure pro-base (or base-
tolerant) forces have gained some ground in political circles throughout the islands. 
While “All-Okinawa” candidates have won 12 and lost only one of the gubernatorial 
and national Diet elections over the five years from 2014, at the city mayor level 
eight of the prefecture’s eleven local government bodies, including key centres such 
as Ginowan, Nago, and Okinawa cities, were as of 2019 headed by the mayors who 
belong to “Team Okinawa” who are for the most part silent on the Futenma 
replacement and Henoko construction issues but backed by the Liberal-Democratic 
Party and inclined to cooperate with the Abe government. They constitute what 
became known as “Team Okinawa”, a well-organized and strongly Tokyo-backed 
opposition to the anti-base “All-Okinawa” forces led by 
 
 
 
 
(32) The same fate was to befall Hatoyama Yukio as Prime Minister in 2009-10.  
(33) Reported in January 2018. (The State of the Japanese State, p. 115.) 
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Governor Tamaki.”(34)  
In September 2019, when Ginowan City Assembly, reluctant home to 
Futenma Marine Corps base, adopted a resolution calling for the Futenma base 
to be relocated from within its city boundaries to Henoko (in Nago City), it was 
the first time for any local government body to declare explicit support for the 
government’s relocation agenda.(35) It followed, and in a sense responded to, the 
resolution adopted the previous day by Nago City Assembly demanding an 
immediate halt to construction works at Henoko. Having waited 23 years (since 
1996) for the return of core city lands long appropriated by the Marine Corps, it 
is not surprising that some in Ginowan City political and economic circles 
should surrender to the government’s plan to accomplish reversion by shifting 
the burden to another city. Upon such divisions the Government can be expected 
to work harder henceforth to drive the wedge deeper and to persuade other cities, 
especially Nago to submit. 
 
It is also the case that, like Onaga before him, Governor Tamaki today confines 
his objections to the Henoko new base project and takes no position on the 
comprehensive militarization of the prefecture, on the helipad works in the Yambaru 
forest in the north of Okinawa Island or on the Abe government’s rapidly advancing 
plans for the extension of military (i.e., Japanese Self-Defence Force) facilities 
through the Southwest islands adjacent to Okinawa island, notably Miyako, Ishigaki, 
and Yonaguni. Tamaki confirmed his pro-Security Treaty, pro-base stance in 
speeches in Tokyo and New York in November 2018.(36) He makes no real effort to 
ban the use of northern Okinawan ports for transport of reclamation/construction 
materials by ship, (and of fill by road) and very 
  
(34) Okinawa taimusu (2019). Ikkatsu kofukin no kakuju o, hoshukei 8 shicho de tsukuru ʻchimu 
Okinawaʼ, jiminto ni yosei. Okinawa taimusu, September 3, 2019. 
(35) Asahi Shimbun (2019). Henoko isetsu no sokushin motomeru ketsugi, Ginowan shigikai 
ʻgaman genkaiʼ. Asahi shimbun, September 27, 2019. 
(36) To the Foreign Correspondents Club of Japan on 9 November and to New York University on 
11 November. See discussion in Kihara Satoru (2018). Okinawa, bei sentoki FA18 no suiraku 
wa nani o shimesu ka. Ari no hitokoto, (November 15, 2018). Retrieved January 16, 2020, 
from https://blog.goo.ne.jp/satoru-kihara/d/20181115 
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recently he introduced his and the prefecture’s stance in a May 2019 letter to the 
US ambassador (and through him to President Trump) that adopted an almost 
grovelling tone, saying that he, and Okinawa, “appreciate the United States 
government for its tremendous contributions in maintaining the security of 
Japan as well as the peace and security of East Asia.”(37) 
 
Tamaki also supports the “return” by the US of Naha Military Port. That 
return, first promised in 1974, 45-years ago, was made dependent on 
construction of an alternative. As “reversion” of Futenma Marine Air Station 
meant construction of the much expanded and upgraded Henoko facility, so that 
of Naha Military Port came to mean major new base construction at adjacent 
Urasoe. In 2019, long suspended negotiations on the move were resumed 
between the prefecture, Naha City and Urasoe City,(38) none expressing any 
doubt as to the prefecture’s continuing to host a major US military port facility. 
The Naha Military Port, like the Kadena US Air Force base and the Marine 
Corps’ Futenma, is sacrosanct. “Reversion,” for any major US military facility, 
can only be upgrading or improving. The return of Naha Military Port, already 
45-years delayed, could not occur earlier than 2028.(39) 
 
Furthermore, Governor Tamaki was no sooner elected (in September 2018) than 
he indicated his readiness to consider one of the key US demands for the Japanese 
client state: the transformation of military bases in Okinawa from single (US or 
Japan) management and use to “joint” facilities.(40) His declaration to the right-wing 
national newspaper, Sankei Shimbun occurred almost simultaneously with the report 
of the Washington Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) making 
precisely that same demand. Both were looking to reinforce 
  
(37) Governor Tamaki, Letter to William F. Hagerty, US ambassador to Japan, May 14, 2019. 
Retrieved January 16, 2020, from http://dc-office.org/post/1056/ 
(38) Okinawa taimusu (2019). Naha gunko no Urasoe isetsu-an, Okinawa-ken, Naha-shi, Urasoe-
shi ga kento kaigi setchi de goi. Okinawa taimusu, October 25, 2019. 
(39) Naha Port (2018). Global Security. Retrieved November 10, 2018, from https://www. 
globalsecurity.org/military/facility/naha-port.html/  
(40) Sankei Shimbun (2018). Tamaki Deni-shi, jieitai to beigun no kichi kyodo shiyo kyogi mo, 
intabyu de hyomei, Okinawa ken chijisen. October 2, 2018. 
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the US-Japan alliance.(41) So the Okinawan Governor’s message to Tokyo and 
Washington is to support and embrace Ampo; just please stop Henoko. 
 
As of early 2020, the national government attempts to find answers to the 
engineering tasks it has now admitted while the anti-base Okinawan movement 
seeks to widen the focus of struggle from the effort to stop Henoko to a broader 
anti-militarist stance. The challenge for the popular movement is to 
simultaneously combat the deeply entrenched, comprehensive prefectural 
submission to the US military (including but not confined to Henoko), the 
ongoing expansion of Japan’s own militarism on the outlying Okinawa islands 
and the planned development of the new Urasoe “Military Port” base project. 
 
VI. Okinawa in (US) Court and Congress  
But if the domestic prospect does not look bright, what might be the prospects 
beyond Japan? The internationalisation of the Okinawa issue provides ground for 
cautious optimism. Global attention occasionally focuses on Okinawa, as in January 
2014 when 103 “international scholars, peace activists and artists” issued a 
statement condemning the moves to reclaim a swathe of Oura Bay and construct the 
base.(42) But it proved difficult to maintain that momentum and the matter became so 
complex that many could not grasp its twists and turns. 
 
However, there is a possibility of a thumbs down from either a US court or even 
directly from the Pentagon on the Henoko project. Two such matters warrant 
attention. First, a suit launched in 2003 in the name of the dugong [that docile, 
seagrass-munching mammal] by a coalition of Okinawan, Japanese and American 
nature NGOs in a Californian district court under the US National Historic 
Preservation Act (1966) is currently before the US Court of Appeal with a verdict 
expected during 2020. It has become one of the longest-running nature protection 
suits in US history. The court is considering an appeal in the name of 
 
(41) See the CSIS reports of 2012 and 2018.  
(42) Peace Philosophy Centre (2014). International Scholars, Peace Activists, and Artists Condemn 
Agreement to Construct US Marine Base in Okinawa. (January 7, 2014). Retrieved January 
16, 2020, from www.peacephilosophy.com/2014/01/internatonal-scholars-peace -activists. 
html/ 
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the dugong, in the case that began as “Dugong dugong vs Donald Rumsfeld,” 
against a Californian court’s August 2018 ruling in favour of the government’s 
construction plans. The NGO’s insist that the government’s withholding of 
crucial environmental information (especially the sea-bottom mayonnaise) 
should make its conclusion that the dugong would not suffer “adverse effects” 
from construction improper and unwarranted.(43) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Illustration from the “Save the Dugong” International Campaign. Source: J. Willen .Dugong_ 
Marsa_Alam. Julian Willen/Wikimedia Commons. Retrieved January 13, 2020, from https:// 
commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Dugong_Marsa_Alam.jpg 
 
It would be hard to imagine a more serious and adverse effect of the project 
for the dugong than extinction. Little attention has so far been paid to this 
ongoing case in either Japan or the US, but its implications are considerable. 
Among other things, it amounts to a major test of the independence of the US 
judicial system. It is very much a confrontation of our times between nature and 
militarism, and it may well be that the chances are better of a favourable judicial 
outcome in a US court than in Japanese one. 
 
 
(43) Hideki Yoshikawa (2019). Abe’s military base plan sinking in mayonnaise: implications for 
the US court and IUCN,” The Asia-Pacific Journal – Japan Focus, 17. See also Hideki 
Yoshikawa (2009). Dugong swimming in uncharted waters: US judicial intervention to 
protect Okinawa’s ‘natural monument’ and halt base construction. The Asia-Pacific Journal - 
Japan Focus, 7. and Hideki Yoshikawa (2018). Jugon saiban: Jugonen no kei-i to kongo no 
tembo. Kankyo to Kogai, pp. 29-33. 
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There is also a significant new development on the US political front. The 
US Congress is currently undertaking a “review of the planned distribution of 
members of the United States Armed Forces in Okinawa, Guam, Hawaii, 
Australia, and elsewhere” under the National Defense Authorization Act. 
Seizing that as an opportunity, thirty-three Okinawan civil society organizations 
recently addressed a cogent appeal to the Senate and House Armed Services 
Committees, calling for reconsideration of the Henoko project as part of this 
process on “democratic, legal, environmental and cultural” grounds.(44) In 
November 2019, Governor Tamaki appealed to US government circles in 
Washington on this matter. The outcome is far from assured, but while the 
United States has from time to time indicated an openness to consider 
alternatives to Henoko, insisting that it is a matter for the Japanese to resolve, so 
long as the Japanese government remains adamant and pays for everything, it 
seems likely that the US government will continue showing the green light even 
if it agrees with the analysis posed by Okinawan civil society, and actually 
thinks of the project as dubious, if not already failed. 
 
Still, the fact is that “Okinawa” was included in the original Senate draft as 
needing to be reviewed. If indeed the Henoko project is seriously reviewed its 
absurdity will be difficult to conceal. 
 
VII. UN(ESCO) and IUCN  
The Government of Japan in 2017 submitted an application for registration 
of a swathe of territory in the Okinawan Islands (Amamioshima, Tokunoshima, 
Iriomote and the Yambaru forest of northern Okinawa) as World Heritage 
wilderness. The question of Yambaru, adjacent to the US military’s Northern 
Training Area and close to the Henoko-Oura Bay base construction site, raises 
 
(44) For a critical discussion from an Okinawan NGO perspective, Okinawa Environmental Justice 
Project, “Yambaru Forest’s Second Attempt for World Natural Heritage Status: Improvements 
and Challenges”. 26 February 2019. http://okinawaejp.blogspot.com/2019/2/yambaru-forests-
second-attempt-for.html. See also Hideki Yoshikawa (2019). Hesitant heritage: US bases on 
Okinawa and Japan’s flawed bid for World Natural Heritage status. Asia-Pacific Journal – 
Japan Focus. 
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acute problems for a government that has repeatedly made clear that base and 
military considerations trump climate change or species depletion in 
determining policy. 
 
As part of the deliberative process, the International Union for the Conservation 
of Nature (IUCN), which advises UNESCO has already called three times (2000, 
2004, 2008) on the Japanese and US governments to “conduct a proper EIA and to 
implement a protection plan for the dugong.”(45) Addressing the Government of 
Japan’s 2017 submission it raised significant questions and called on Japan to 
“clarify” its “Northern Parts of Okinawa Island (NPOI)” [i.e. the Yambaru forest] 
submission. The government of Japan thereupon withdrew its submission, revising 
and re-submitting it early in 2019,(46) but still failing to mention the fact that parts of 
the proposed Wilderness had been used for decades as a US jungle warfare training 
site and remained “littered with bullet shells, unexploded ordnance, and other, 
discarded military materials, including toxic chemicals,” and that the Henoko 
Marine Corps base to which the Government is intent on constructing would, if ever 
completed, house at least 70 military aircraft that would among other things conduct 
low-level and night flights above the forest.(47) Even as the government struggled to 
find verbal formula that would not dwell on matters that might diminish its Heritage 
project, the environment of Yambaru forest and Oura Bay was degenerating. 
 
The extraordinary bio-diversity of Oura Bay is not disputed. The government’s 
own Okinawa Defense Bureau (ODB) puts the figure of 5,334 on the bio-species of 
the Bay (262 of them endangered).(48) 2018 was the International Year of Coral. As if 
to mark the occasion, ironically, the government of Japan set about 
 
 
(45) Okinawa Environmental Justice Project, op. cit.  
(46) The Government of Japan (2019). Nomination of Amami-Oshima Island, Tokunoshima Island, 
the Northern Part of Okinawa Island, and Iriomote Island [for UNESCO World Natural 
Heritage]. Retrieved January 28, 2020, from http://kyushu.env.go.jp/okinawa/amami-okinawa/ 
world-natural-heritage/index-en.html/. 
 
(47) Okinawa Enviromental Justice Project, op. cit.  
(48) Sakurai Kunitoshi (2018). Oura-wan seibutsu ni shi no senkoku. Ryukyu shimpo, 
Retrieved December 2, 2018. 
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reclaiming much of one of the world’s most prolific and bio-diverse coastal coral 
reef zones, killing off unique and precious colonies in the process. Prime Minister 
Abe assured the Diet that endangered coral from the construction site had been 
safely transplanted when in fact just nine Porites Okinawensis colonies had been 
relocated, of a total of 74,000 needing transplant.(49) Prefectural permission (unlikely 
to be granted) is required and the survival rate for transplanted coral is low. Apart 
from the coral, by 2019 the dugong (less than 10 individuals left) and the Okinawa 
Woodpecker or noguchigera, (between 50 and 249 individuals left), both steadily 
decline in numbers and are “critically endangered.”(50) The dugong could conceivably 
be already extinct as none had been sighted for over a year.(51) As for the 
noguchigera, the US-based Center for Biological Diversity has served notice of its 
intent to file suit against the US government (the Fisheries and Wildlife Service in 
the Department of the Interior) for failure to protect it in the forest area in the 
vicinity of the US Northern Training Area.(52) 
 
So long as the state gave priority to military concerns, the condition of Oura 
Bay would continue to decline. It strained global credibility for the government 
of Japan to declare that Northern Okinawa will be both protected as one of the 
world’s most bio-diverse and pristine environments and simultaneously 
developed into a world-ranking concentration of military force. 
 
For Okinawa, in other words, the national polity of Japan as a US client state  
 
(49) Ryukyu Shimpo (2019). For Henoko land reclamation, Prime Minister Abe claims, ʻThe coral 
there is being relocated,ʼ however the reality is no such activity is taking place in the landfill 
area. Ryukyu Shimpo, January 8, 2019. 
 
(50) IUCN (2019). Red List. (December 2019). Retrieved January 16, 2020, from https://www. 
iucnredlist.org/species/157011948/157011982/ 
(51) Apart from the discovery of one dugong corpse (Individual B) in March 2019, other 
previously sighted animals, including those known as A and C, had not been sighted for more 
than one year. Okinawa taimusu (2019). Dugong zetsumetsu kaʼ koji o tome zenken chosa o. 
Okinawa taimusu, October 13, 2019. 
(52) Centre for Biological Diversity (2019). Lawsuit Launched to Protect Critically Endangered 
Okinawa Woodpecker. (June 26, 2019). Retrieved January 16, 2020, from https:// 
biologicaldiversity.org/w/news/press-releases/lawsuit-launched-protect-critically-endangered-
okinawa-woodpecker-2019-06-26/ 
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calls for transformation of one of nature’s greatest natural treasure-houses into a 
fortress from which the United States could continue indefinitely projecting its 
power over East Asia. It was,“counter to the moves towards regional peace, 
cooperation and community, counter to the principle of regional self-
government spelled out in the constitution, counter to the principles of 
democracy and counter to the imperative of environmental conservation.”(53) 
 
VIII. Conclusion 
 
As the problems mount, more experts, and more peace, human rights, and 
environmental organizations come to doubt the Government of Japan’s 
competence and the viability of its scheme. Many will see it, as did the editorial 
board of the New York Times in October 2018, as “an unfair, unwanted and 
often dangerous burden on Japan’s poorest citizens.”(54) Others recoil in disgust 
from the spectacle of a natural wonderland and cradle of biodiversity being 
sacrificed to the interest of the Pentagon. 
 
For Okinawans, the continued depredations on their environment in the name of 
defense and national security have the same ring as would the appropriation of the 
Grand Canyon as a military base to a citizen of the United States. In sum, the 
Okinawan anti-base movement has judicial, political, and environmental levers of 
pressure to try to secure its objectives against the national government. Their 
coordination across Okinawan, national, and international fronts is the challenge. 
The essential absurdity of the Henoko project is their core message. While the 
prospect of a favourable outcome at the political or judicial level in Japan is far from 
bright, it is somewhat brighter in the US court system, the US Congress, and the 
UN-centered global environmental protection forum (UNESCO/Wilderness/ IUCN). 
Were any such to occur, it would have huge potential consequences. 
 
It may be that the “Okinawa” cause can only be effective nationally when 
“All-Okinawa” becomes “All-Japan.,” when the struggle comes to be and to be 
 
(53) The State of the Japanese State, pp. 246-7  
(54) The Editorial Board (2018). Toward a smaller American footprint on Okinawa. New York 
Times, October 1, 2018. 
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seen as “national,” when regular charter flights begin to ferry mainland students, 
citizen activists, professors to join the Bay-front protests, and when the 
Okinawan case is effectively presented before multiple international fora. 
 
While the two governments ride roughshod over Okinawan creatures such as 
the dugong, the woodpecker, and the blue (and other) coral, it is at least possible 
that Okinawan nature might launch a successful resistance in the unlikely venue 
of a US court. Otherwise, there is the potential for the intervention of nature itself. 
Abe’s government likely have no real technical “fix” for the project’s geological, 
seismological, and climatological problems. Human laws may be twisted or 
ignored, but not so the laws of nature. 
 
Fatigued by decades of exhausting struggle against a relentless and 
unprincipled foe, the sentiment nevertheless remains strong in Okinawa that 
popular resistance will prove more than a match for the force of the Japanese 
state, that therefore Henoko will not be built, and that a halt can be called to the 
steady militarisation of Okinawa and its adjacent islands. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Resistant Islands, Second Edition, Rowman and Littlefield, 2018. 
 
IX. Postscript  
The intractable nature of the “Okinawa problem” owes much to decisions 
made during the tumultuous years that followed the collapse of the Japanese 
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empire in 1945, when the state structure for Japan was set in place. Under the 
constitution adopted in 1946, the emperor was absolved of responsibility for the 
war and reinstated at the peak of the state system, albeit in “symbolic” role. 
However, no sooner did Hirohito take up this new role, in 1947, than he 
intervened at the very highest level in a matter of national policy by urging the 
US to maintain its direct rule of Okinawa, severing it from Japan under direct 
US military rule. The US Mission’s W.J. Sebald commented that the emperor’s 
“hope” for continuing US military occupation of the Ryukyus “undoubtedly is 
based upon self-interest.” By that he implied that Hirohito was ensuring his 
future as pro-American and pro-occupation, providing good reason to pass over 
his very recent role as Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Japanese Army. 
When Hirohito took this remarkable initiative, he was only months into the 
newly circumscribed constitutional role as “symbol” and was acting in breach of 
it. That 1947 document is attached below. (55) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________ 
 
(55) W.J. Sebald (US Political Adviser for Japan), "Emperor of Japan's Opinion concerning the 
Future of the Ryukyu Islands," Memorandum to Secretary of State, 22 September 1947, US 
National Archives, Maryland, copy accessible at Okinawa Prefectural Archives at 
https://www.archives.pref.okinawa.jp/wp-content/uploads/Emperors-message.pdf/.  
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Four years later, the United States’ special adviser on policy for the restoration of 
sovereignty to Japan, John Foster Dulles, arrived in Tokyo to negotiate the terms of a 
peace treaty. The following principle may be referred to as the “Dulles Demand.” 
“Do we get the right to station as many troops as we want where we want and for as 
long as we want? That is the principle question.”(56) 
 
With Okinawa completely cut off from it as in effect a US military colony, 
Japan proper was to be subject to an only slightly modified form of US 
hegemony. It was the clearest possible statement of principle, taking away with 
one hand the sovereignty being granted with the other. 
 
The third document included here (in part) is the November 1971 proposal 
by the Government of the Ryukyu Islands (Okinawa) on the eve of “reversion” 
to Japan the following year.(57) It reads (in part): 
 
For these 26 years since the end of war, America has exercised direct 
control over Okinawa. In the name of defence of the free world in the Far 
East, America has taken exclusive arbitrary actions to construct huge 
military bases. It feels as though Okinawa exists within a US base. The one-
million people of Okinawa have lived these past 26 years on these narrow 
islands surrounded by military bases, nuclear weapons and gas weapons. 
Not only that but our various political rights have been encroached upon to 
suit the military priorities of a foreign people and even our basic human 
rights have been denied us…. We strongly appeal for reversion as islands of 
peace, without war … 
 
 
 
 
 
(56) J. F. Dulles (1951). Dulles Mission Staff Meeting, January 26, 1951. Department of State, 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 6, pp. 811-5, at p. 812. 
(57) Ryukyu Seifu (1971). Fukki sochi ni kansuru kengisho. (November 16, 1971)., Okinawa-ken 
kobun shokan [Okinawa Prefectural Archives]. Retrieved January 20, 2020, from https://www. 
archives.pref.okinawa.jp/proposal_document/. 
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A majority of Okinawan people are dissatisfied because our wishes 
have not been properly taken into account and the military bases are being 
made permanent under the reversion. … And, as to the stationing of 
Japanese Self-Defense Forces in Okinawa an absolute majority is opposed 
to this … Having suffered horrendously in the last war, we seek absolute 
peace and reject everything to do with war.(58) 
 
 
While Ryukyu chief executive Yara Chobyo was still on his way to the Diet 
to deliver the Okinawan petition to the special session on Okinawan reversion, 
before either of the two Okinawan representatives had had a chance to speak 
and in the absence of the opposition parties, the [governing] Liberal Democratic 
Party railroaded the reversion agreement through the Diet, “disposing” (shobun) 
of Okinawa much as had the Japanese state in 1879 when it tortured and 
intimidated Okinawan elites into submission, abolished the Ryukyu Kingdom 
and assimilated the islands under its control. 
 
Ignoring the bitter complaint uttered by Yara in 1971, Okinawa was 
 
returned to Japan in continuing submission to the will of the Pentagon, under the 
 
long shadows cast by Emperor Hirohito and John Foster Dulles. The Okinawan 
 
aspiration to demilitarize and enjoy constitutionally proclaimed human rights 
 
uttered then by Yara has been countless times repeated by later Governors and 
 
(prefectural) governments but in 2020 as in 1971 governments in Tokyo and 
 
Washington have no ears to listen.  
 
 
 
(58) Ibid. 
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<Summary> 
 
 
Gavan McCormack 
 
Gavan McCormack here explores matters raised in his 2018 book with Satoko 
Oka Norimatsu (Resistant Islands: Okinawa Confronts Japan and the United States, 
2nd edition), outlines recent judicial, political, diplomatic and ecological 
developments with a bearing on the "Okinawa problem," and considers the tactics 
and strategy employed in the long-running contest by Okinawa's social movements 
on the one hand and the Japanese state on the other. The text that follows is a 
slightly revised version of the invited lecture he delivered at International Christian 
University in Tokyo on 11 November 2019. A postscript includes three documents, 
dating from 1947, 1951, and 1971, that dramatically illustrate the deep-rooted and 
multi-dimensional quality of the “Okinawa problem.” 
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